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1. Introduction 
The introduction of term limits for public officials is an unusual “natural experiment" 
in electoral system change that provides a unique testing ground to study the incentive effects 
of elections on economic policy choices. By reducing rents from holding office, term limits 
may increase politicians’ incentives to act on behalf of general welfare and not pander to 
public opinion (Smart and Sturm, 2013). However, they may also reduce reputation-building 
efforts and the accumulation of experience by incumbent politicians, while diminishing the 
power of elections to scrutinize competent policymakers (Besley and Case, 1995; Alt et al., 
2011; Bonfiglioli and Gancia, 2013). The controversy regarding the impacts of term limits 
and the focus of most of the existing analyses on the US reality render special importance to 
the study of the effects of term limits in other countries with different institutional, economic 
and social settings. 
This paper assesses the effects of term limits on the management of local fiscal policy, 
using as a natural experiment the recent introduction of term limits at the municipal level in 
Portugal. According to a law approved in 2005, mayors cannot serve for more than three 
consecutive terms in the same municipality. Despite the fact that 52% of the Portuguese 
mayors were prevented from running for reelection when the limit became binding in the 
2013 local elections, the impact of this institutional change is clearly under-researched. The 
scarcity of natural experiments such as these and the fact that, in the published literature for 
countries other than the US, only Brazil and Italy have been studied at the local level renders 
additional relevance to the analysis of the Portuguese case. 
The empirical analysis applies a difference-in-differences (DD) framework to study 
the effects of the exogenous imposition of term limits (through a law approved in the national 
parliament) on fiscal policy choices at the local level. This natural experiment, in which the 
treatment group is comprised of municipalities with term-limited (lame duck) mayors, while 
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those with reelection-eligible mayors are in the control group, is initially used to check 
whether being a term-limited mayor influences fiscal policy choices or not. Then, extended 
DD models, which control for different types of term-limited mayors and for experience, 
allow for the analysis of heterogeneity in electoral incentives and of accountability effects of 
elections, by comparing the behavior of reelection-eligible and term-limited mayors who 
have served for three or more consecutive terms. Finally, another extension of the DD model 
is used to test the existence of political budget cycles and the hypotheses that term-limited 
mayors are less opportunistic than reelection-eligible mayors are, and that all lame ducks are 
not equally opportunistic. We use a comprehensive dataset comprising all 308 Portuguese 
municipalities over four 4-year terms (from 1998 to 2013). The dataset includes the full 
public accounts of municipalities and detailed information describing mayors and socio-
economic and demographic characteristics of municipalities.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the literature on 
term limits. Section 3 describes the Portuguese local governments’ institutional setting and 
the data used in the empirical analysis. The difference-in-differences econometric models are 
presented in Section 4, the econometric results are described in Section 5, and Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature review 
A fundamental question in political economy is whether the possibility of reelection affects 
policy choices. By making officials accountable, elections induce them to act in the public 
interest, reducing moral-hazard (Barro, 1973). If incumbents care about reelection prospects, 
they are keen to develop a reputation that enhances their reelection chances. Additionally, 
elections allow the electorate to remove from office politicians who do not behave according 
to the general interest (Ferejohn, 1986), therefore creating an adverse-selection correction 
effect. However, when there is asymmetric information between incumbents and voters, the 
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desire to win elections may lead politicians to adopt populist measures to win votes (Rogoff, 
1990; Harrington, 1993). Furthermore, lobbyist capture may increase with additional terms 
in office (Fund, 1990; Ehrenhalt, 1991). 
The rise in public debt levels and the sovereign debt crisis faced by several countries 
increased interest in studying the advantages and disadvantages of democracy and the effects 
of constitutional design on public finance. Maskin and Tirole (2004) propose a model to 
analyze when decision powers should be given directly to voters, delegated to elected 
representatives, or to non-elected officials. Regarding the optimal term length, they conclude 
that it should balance the costs of replacing officials with voters’ risk aversion to officials 
adopting policies because they are popular. Bonfiglioli and Gancia (2013) develop a rational 
model of electoral accountability to study the determinants of political myopia. Despite the 
political myopia resulting from reelection concerns, they find that ruling out the possibility 
of reelection reduces politicians’ effort and removes the possibility of retaining the best 
performing officials. They conclude that holding elections is better than having a one-term 
limit, unless rents from office are very large and differences in ability are low. Similarly, 
Smart and Sturm (2013) developed a political agency model to show that, despite the 
accountability effect of elections, term limits can be in the interest of the electorate. By 
reducing the value of office, term limits induce incumbents to implement policies that are 
closer to voters’ preferences, enabling them to reelect higher quality agents. 
Empirical studies analyzing the effects of term limits are relatively scarce, and most 
of them focus on American states. For US state governors, most studies found systematic 
differences in state fiscal policies depending on whether governors are subject to a binding 
term limitation or allowed to stand for reelection. Taxes and expenditures tend to be higher, 
while income growth tends to be lower, in states imposing term limits, because lame ducks 
care less about building political reputation (Besley and Case, 1995, 2003; Alt et al., 2011). 
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Furthermore, accountability and competence effects of elections on governors’ performance 
are different: Economic growth is higher and taxes, spending and borrowing costs are lower 
under reelection-eligible incumbents than under lame ducks (accountability effect), and 
under reelected incumbents than under first-term incumbents (competence effect), all else 
equal. The two effects are of similar magnitude, and in the case of two-term limits, they can 
cancel each other out (Alt et al., 2011). Empirical results for the effects of term limits in US 
state legislatures on spending are mixed (Bails and Tieslau, 2000; Erler, 2007; Reed et al., 
1998).1 However, term limits seem to negatively impact on states’ fiscal deficits (Cummins, 
2012) and bond ratings (Lewis, 2012). Recently, doubts were raised on the research design 
of previous studies, because they did not take into account that the variables which predict 
the introduction of term limits in a given state may also influence budgetary decisions. When 
using the synthetic case control method to account for heterogeneity in the probability of 
treatment, there is little evidence that term limits on legislators affect state spending (Keele 
et al., 2013). 
Also for the US states, several studies investigated whether term limits reduce 
electoral manipulations of fiscal variables and pork-barrel policies. For general expenditure, 
gubernatorial term limits do not appear to significantly affect the magnitude of the political 
business cycles (Rose, 2006). This finding suggests that governors care for their reputation, 
probably because they intend to run for higher offices or want to help their party’s candidate. 
However, for environmental policy, when the electorate is pro-environment, lame ducks 
seem to spend less on the environment than reelection-eligible incumbents (List and Sturm, 
2006). Finally, there is evidence that legislators bring less pork provision (fiscal transfers) to 
																																								 																				
1 Bails and Tieslau (2000) find that states with term limits have lower spending than states without them, Erler 
(2007) argues the reverse, and Reed et al. (1998) conclude that there are no effects.  
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their districts if they cannot run for another term (Bernhardt et al., 2004; Aidt and Shvets, 
2012). 
 Studies focusing on term limits at the local government level are scarce. To the best 
of our knowledge, only the Brazilian, Italian and Portuguese cases have been studied. For 
Brazilian municipalities, the empirical evidence suggests that mayors that can run for another 
term are less corrupt than those that cannot (Ferraz and Finan, 2011), but adopt more 
opportunistic policies (Klein and Sakurai, 2015). In Italian municipalities, term-limited 
mayors set lower property tax rates than reelection-eligible incumbents during the term, but 
a higher rate before the elections (Padovano and Petrarca, 2014). For Portugal, preliminary 
research suggests that mayors who cannot stand for another term in office choose lower 
current expenditures and property tax rates relative to reelection-eligible incumbents (Lopes 
da Fonseca, 2016).2 
In sum, the introduction of term limits provides a unique opportunity to analyze the 
effects of elections on fiscal policy choices. We believe that our research on the Portuguese 
natural experiment can move forward the literature on the topic in several ways. First, the 
effects of term limits have been studied mainly at the state level for the US. Other countries’ 
experiences with term limits, especially at the local/municipal level, are clearly under-
researched and may provide useful insights for countries with similar institutional systems. 
While in the US, states decide on the adoption of term limits, and term-limit laws vary from 
state to state,3 in Portugal the institutional reform was approved by the national parliament 
(exogenously imposed), and the same law applies to all local governments, rendering the 
estimation of the term-limit treatment effect less problematic. Second, unlike most previous 
																																								 																				
2	By focusing on just four fiscal policy variables (related only to current expenditures and revenues), and not 
accounting for the experience of mayors and heterogeneity among term-limited mayors, this working paper’s 
analysis is considerably narrower in scope than ours.	
3 States adopt limits of varying lengths and limits can be consecutive or lifetime. 
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research, we take into account the effects of incumbents’ experience on fiscal policy choices. 
Third, we have built an extensive dataset on local public finances that goes beyond major 
aggregates, and includes the socio-economic characteristics of municipalities, and detailed 
information on mayors, therefore allowing for a thorough study of the effects of term limits 
on municipal fiscal variables. Finally, we are able to disentangle various types of term-
limited mayors (resigning mayors, candidates to other offices, true lame ducks) which 
provides an opportunity to enrich our knowledge on the underlying causes of eventual 
behavioral changes during the last term. 
 
3. Research laboratory and data 
Portugal is a unitary state,4 with 308 municipalities (278 of which are in the 
mainland), all subject to the same legal and institutional framework. Municipalities have a 
deliberative branch (the Municipal Assembly) and an executive branch (the Town Council). 
More than half of the Municipal Assembly’s members are elected directly by voters, and the 
remaining members are the presidents of the councils of the freguesias that belong to the 
municipality (who are also elected directly by voters). The mayor is the president of the Town 
Council and has a prominent role in the executive branch. Besides the mayor, the Town 
Council includes between four to sixteen additional members depending on the number of 
voters registered in the municipality. All of its members are elected directly by voters, who 
vote on party or independent closed lists. Mandates are assigned according to the d’Hondt 
method, and the first candidate of the list receiving most votes becomes the mayor. Elections 
for the Municipal Assembly and the Town Council were always held on the same day, and 
																																								 																				
4 Administrative regions were established only in the archipelagos of Azores and Madeira. Local governments 
include the municipal and parish levels, with each municipality including several parishes (freguesias). The 
latter have a very limited number of functions and resources, and detailed fiscal data at the parish level are not 
available. 
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took place in December until 2001, and subsequently in October. The first elections after the 
reestablishment of democracy in 1974 were held in December 1976. Terms were three years 
long until 1985, when they were extended to four years.   
Until the 2013 local elections, there were no limits on the number of consecutive 
terms a mayor could serve. In 2013, the average number of terms in office was 2.94, and two 
municipalities (Braga and Vila Nova de Poiares) had the same mayor from 1976 to 2013 (for 
10 consecutive terms). A law approved in 2005 (Law n.º 46/2005) imposed a three-term limit 
for mayors. This law became binding in the 2013 elections, forbidding 160 mayors from 
running for reelection in the same municipality. Of these, 82 belonged to the center-right 
Social Democratic Party (PPD-PSD) or a coalition of PPD-PSD with the Popular Party, 59 
to the Socialist Party, 13 to the Communist Party, one to the Left Block, and five were 
independent. Of the 148 reelection-eligible mayors, 87 were in their first term, and 61 were 
in the second. Figure 1 presents a map of Portugal, where the municipalities of the term-
limited mayors are shaded in red. It can be observed that they were distributed all over the 
country, with no clear regional pattern. 
Although many term-limited mayors remained in office until the ends of their terms 
and did not run for further offices in 2013 (the 61 henceforth referred to as true lame ducks), 
more than half behaved differently. Twenty-one mayors resigned before the end of their 
terms, being replaced by their vice-mayors, most of whom ran for mayor in the next 
elections.5 Seventy-five mayors, including seven of the resigning mayors, ran for president 
																																								 																				
5 By resigning, a mayor does not regain eligibility for election, but gives some incumbency advantage to the 
vice-mayor who seeks election. We do not treat as resigning four mayors who stepped down just four months 
or less before the elections, as they practically concluded their terms and did not give their vice-mayors enough 
time to introduce changes in local fiscal policy or to benefit from incumbency advantage. Seven resigning 
mayors who also ran for other offices are treated simply as resigning mayors, so that there is no overlap between 
the three types of term-limited mayors considered in the empirical analysis. 
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of the Municipal Assembly. Finally, ten term-limited mayors ran for mayor in a different 
municipality, six of whom were elected.  
Figure 1: Terms in office of Portuguese mayors at the beginning 
of the term leading to the 2013 elections 
 
Source: Portuguese Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
 
Given that 52% of all mayors could not run for reelection in the 2013 elections, this 
legislative reform led to a significant turnover of mayors, and may have had a strong impact 
on local fiscal policy choices. To study the effects of this exogenous institutional change, a 
large and detailed panel dataset was built, composed of annual data on fiscal, economic, 
political and socio-economic variables for all 308 Portuguese municipalities, from 1998 to 
2013. Data on local finances were collected from the General Directorate of Local 
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Authorities (DGAL)’s annual publication Municipal Finances (Finanças Municipais) and 
from DGAL’s website (www.portalautarquico.pt). Political data was obtained from the 
National Elections Commission, economic and demographic data from the National 
Statistics Institute (INE), and socio-economic indicators from the Pordata database and the 
Marktest’s Sales Index database. Data on mayors’ characteristics and terms in office was 
provided by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table A.1 
in the Appendix. 
 
4. Econometric models 
Panel data models are estimated for the 308 Portuguese municipalities, covering the period 
from 1998 to 2013. This time period covers the four municipal terms ending in the elections 
of 2001, 2005, 2009, and 2013. Given that the law restricting the number of consecutive 
terms in office entered into force in the beginning of 2006, the sample period includes two 
terms before and two terms after that event. But, since the term limits became binding in the 
2013 elections, only the last 4-year term in our sample has term-limited mayors who cannot 
run for reelection.  
 
4.1 Baseline and extended difference-in-differences models 
The effects of the introduction of binding term limits to Portuguese mayors are assessed in a 
difference-in-differences (DD) framework, over the entire sample period of 1998 to 2013. 
Since 160 mayors were lame ducks in their 2010-2013 terms, while the other 148 were 
reelection-eligible, we can consider the municipalities of the term-limited mayors as the 
treatment group, and those of the reelection-eligible ones as the control group.6  
																																								 																				
6 Contrary to what happened in US states, each Portuguese municipality could not decide when to introduce 
term limits, as they were exogenously imposed to all municipalities at the same time, despite the fact that 
mayors in general were against them. Therefore, the use of propensity score matching techniques to identify 
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This DD framework requires that treated and control municipalities exhibit similar 
trends before term limits became binding (in the pre-treatment period). Figure 2 shows the 
paths of the averages of the main fiscal variables in municipalities with term-limited (treated) 
and reelection-eligible (control) mayors, until 2009. The “common trends hypothesis,” 
central to the DD framework, seems to be valid for total and current expenditures and 
revenues, as the lines for the two groups of municipalities exhibit similar behavior. The 
means of the budget balance seem to follow a common trend after 2002. But, regarding 
capital expenditures and revenues, it is not so clear that treated and control municipalities 
behaved in the same manner. 
Additional tests of the validity of the DD framework consisted on checking, for each 
fiscal variable, if treated municipalities behaved differently from the control ones in any year 
of the pre-treatment period, or if they followed a different linear trend. This does not seem 
to have happened to any of the seven fiscal variables considered above (see Figures A.1 and 
A.2 in the Appendix), which provides further support for the validity of our DD framework. 
The lack of statistical significance of the annual dummies for the treated municipalities in 
the period 2006-2009 also suggests that the management of local finances by the mayors that 
would be term-limited in 2010-2013 did not significantly change immediately after the 
approval of the law imposing term limits (due to eventual anticipation effects).7  
																																								 																				
municipalities with similar propensity to adopt term limits is unnecessary in this case. Thus, we believe that a 
regression based DD framework is appropriate to study the effects of the introduction of binding term limits to 
Portuguese mayors. 
7 The approval of the law in August 2005 could also have affected early retirements during the term leading to 
the 2005 and 2009 elections. That is, the fact that some mayors knew that they would be term-limited soon 
could have led them to retire before the law became binding, which could bias the results of the “experiment.” 
This does not seem to have happened. First, the percentages of mayors running for reelection in 2005 and 2009 
were the second and third highest ever (83.1% and 85.06%, respectively), only slightly behind that of 2001 
(85.9%). Second, only nine(six) of the mayors elected in 2001(2005) resigned before the 2005(2009) elections, 
which are lower numbers of resignations than in the term leading to the 2001 elections, in which 13 mayors 
resigned. 
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Figure 2: Trends in the main fiscal variables (1998-2009) 
 
 
Although most of the above-mentioned checks provide support for the “common 
trends hypothesis,” the differences in the means of capital expenditures and revenues shown 
in Figure 2 may cast doubts on its applicability to some fiscal variables. Thus, we opt to be 
extra cautious by controlling for municipal specific trends. According to Angrist and Pischke 
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(2009: 238-241), this allows treatment and control municipalities to follow different trends 
in a limited but potentially relevant way.  
The baseline DD model, used to test the hypothesis that, on average, term-limited 
mayors behave differently from reelection-eligible ones, can be summarized as follows: !" #$% =∝ +)*+,- + ./$%0 + 1$ + 2% + 3$. 5 + 6$%																			 (1)	8 = 1,… ,308							5 = 1998,… , 2013	
where fit is a fiscal variable in municipality i in year t, AB$% is a dummy variable that equals 
1 between 2010 and 2013 for the municipalities that have term-limited mayors (with 3 or 
more consecutive terms in office), and equals zero otherwise. The parameter ) measures the 
treatment effect, Xit is a vector of control variables, µi are the specific effects of municipality 
i, 2% are time effects (year dummies), 3$. 5 are municipal specific time trends, and εit is the 
error term. Vector X includes a set of control variables that may affect local finances:8 
• Left-wing mayor and Independent mayor: these dummy variables control for 
possible ideological effects on local fiscal variables.  
• Majority: dummy variable that takes the value of one when the mayor’s party has, 
simultaneously, majorities in the Town Council and in the Municipal Assembly.  
• Unemployment rate (deviation from HP trend): this variable controls for the 
cyclical component of a municipality’s economic performance. 
																																								 																				
8 An initial version of vector X also included population density, the percentages of the population below 15 
years old and above 65 years old, and a dummy variable for mayors who hold a university degree. But, Variance 
of Inflated Factors (VIF) tests indicate that demographic variables create problems of multicollinearity. Since 
the sample period is relatively short, there is little variation in demographic variables, which results in 
collinearity with the municipal fixed effects. Additionally, due to lack of information on the academic degrees 
of several mayors, the dummy for mayors with a university degree has many missing values, and its inclusion 
in the model leads to the exclusion of 14 municipalities. Although the inclusion of these control variables does 
not significantly affect the main results (available from the authors upon request), we prefer to exclude them. 
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• A set of four variables characterizing mayors: age, a dummy variable for female 
mayors, a dummy for mayors who live in the municipality, and a dummy for 
mayors who were born in the municipality. 
An extended DD model takes the experience effect resulting from holding office into 
account. As demonstrated by Padró i Miquel and Snyder (2006), legislative effectiveness in 
the US rises sharply with tenure, at least for the first few terms, even when other 
characteristics of the legislators are controlled for. They also found that greater effectiveness 
results from learning-by-doing, and has a positive effect on legislators’ electoral success and 
on their probability of moving to higher office. Inspired by these findings, when studying the 
effects of US gubernatorial term limits, Alt et al. (2011) highlighted that it is necessary to 
disentangle accountability effects from competence effects. They suggest that differences in 
performance by reelection-eligible and term-limited incumbents, holding tenure in office 
constant, identify accountability effects. Competence effects are identified by differences in 
performance by incumbents with different terms in office, holding term-limit status constant. 
To distinguish these two types of effects, we include a new dummy variable for less 
experienced reelection-eligible mayors, Term1or2, which takes the value of one for first- and 
second-term mayors, and equals zero otherwise. The model then becomes: !" #$% =∝ +)*+,- + CADEF1GE2$% + ./$%0 + 1$ + 2% + 3$. 5 + 6$%	 (2)	8 = 1,… ,308							5 = 1998,… , 2013	
Following Padró i Miquel and Snyder (2006), less experienced mayors are expected 
to be less efficient (competent). Since the base category in the regression (the omitted 
dummy) is that for reelection-eligible mayors who have served three or more consecutive 
terms in office, a statistically significant coefficient for the dummy variable TL would be 
consistent with accountability effects of elections, that is, with term-limited mayors behaving 
differently from equally experienced reelection-eligible mayors. 
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An additional extension of the DD model accounts for eventual heterogeneous 
electoral incentives of term-limited mayors, due to the differences in behavior regarding the 
2013 municipal elections described in Section 3. Twenty-one mayors resigned before the end 
of their terms, eventually due to low motivation or popularity, and handed over the leadership 
to someone they trusted (their vice-mayors) as a way of increasing their party’s likelihood of 
success at the upcoming election. Mayors who ran for further political office may also have 
behaved differently from true lame ducks, as they were aware that their actions would have 
reputational consequences, and hence determine the likelihood of winning subsequent 
elections. In order to account for the effects of these differences in behavior among mayors,9 
we start by creating a categorical variable (ResOther) which takes the value of one for mayors 
who resigned before the end of their terms, equals two and for those who completed their 
terms and then ran for other political offices, and equals zero otherwise. Then, we interact 
the dummy variable for term-limited mayors (TL) with dummy variables for resigning 
mayors (ResOther=1) and for those who ran for other offices (ResOther=2). The full 
extended DD model is then: !" #$% =∝ +HAB$% + CI JDKL5ℎDE = 1 $% + CN AB$% ∗ JDKL5ℎDE = 1 $% +CP JDKL5ℎDE = 2 $% + CQ AB$% ∗ JDKL5ℎDE = 2 $% +CRADEF1GE2$% + ./$%0 + 1$ + 2% + 3$. 5 + 6$%	 (3)	8 = 1,… ,308							5 = 1998,… , 2013	
The extended model of equation (3) allows us to measure the effects of binding term 
limits for the three types of term-limited mayors. In the case of true lame ducks, ResOther 
equals zero, and the effect of term limits is given by H. Statistical significance of CN or CQ 
would indicate that the effects of term limits for the respective type of mayors are different 
from those for true lame ducks. One problem with the estimation of equation (3) is that the 
																																								 																				
9 Besley and Case (1995) analysed similar situations for US governors. 
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dummies based on ResOther may be affected by the existence binding term limits. In fact, 
the numbers of resigning mayors and of those running for other offices were considerably 
higher in the term leading to the 2013 elections than in the previous terms, and most of those 
mayors were term-limited. Thus, it seems clear that binding term limits influenced those 
decisions, which implies that the dummies based on ResOther are endogenous and that the 
estimation of equation (3) by OLS or fixed effects would lead to biased coefficients. To 
overcome this problem, we estimated by, Maximum Likelihood, a simultaneous equation 
model which combines a multinomial probit for ResOther with a linear regression for the 
fiscal dependent variable.10 In the multinomial probit model for ResOther we include as 
independent variables the explanatory variables of equation (3),11 plus two additional 
variables (instruments) which are expected to influence a mayor’s decision to resign or to 
run for another office, but are not affected by TL: the share of votes received by the mayor’s 
party in the previous elections; and, the number of terms in office of the incumbent mayor. 
The results of our models that assess heterogeneous effects of term limits among 
mayors should be interpreted with caution. The causal interpretation of the interaction effects 
is problematic, and regression analysis with non-experimental data is likely to produce biased 
estimates that overstate the effects (Bullock et al., 2010). This may happen because control 
variables are affected by the treatment or due to the omission of unobserved variables that 
affect interaction variables. Despite our efforts to avoid endogeneity and omitted variable 
																																								 																				
10 According to Roodman (2011), the estimation of a model which uses the information about the limited nature 
of the earlier stage dependent variable is more efficient than a 2SLS estimation, which would treat it as if it 
were continuous and unbounded. Roodman’s (2011) cmp command for Stata is used in our estimations. 
11 Including municipal fixed effects and municipal specific trends, leads to a very high number of variables, 
which frequently implies that convergence is not achieved. In order to achieve convergence in the ML 
estimations, we replaced the 307 municipal specific trends with 25 regional specific trends. As indicated in the 
robustness tests section, doing the same in the models of equations 1, 2 or 4 does not significantly change the 
results. 
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bias problems, we acknowledge that, given the use of non-experimental data, some bias may 
still exist. In fact, even double-blind randomized controlled trials may provide biased 
estimates of the efficacy of treatment if there are interactions between treatment and behavior 
(Chassang et al. 2015).12 
 
4.2 Difference-in-differences model for political budget cycles 
Modified versions of the DD models of equations (2) and (3) are used to test the 
hypothesis that term limits affect the magnitude of political budget cycles (Rogoff, 1990). 
Based on the evidence of opportunistic manipulation of local public finances in Portugal 
(Aidt, Veiga and Veiga 2011; Veiga and Veiga, 2007a), we check if the degree of 
opportunism decreases when term limits are binding. More concretely, we start by testing 
the hypothesis that mayors who have served three or more consecutive terms in office are 
less opportunistic when they are term-limited than when they are reelection-eligible. For 
that purpose, we add to equation (2) an election-year dummy, and its interaction with the 
dummy variables for terms in office. The estimated model is now summarized as: !" #$% =∝ +HAB$% + SITBU$% + SN TBU$% ∗ 	AB$% + SPADEF1GE2$% +SQ TBU$% ∗ 	ADEF1GE2$% + ./$%0 + 1$ + V% + 3$. 5 + 6$%	 (4)	8 = 1,… ,308							5 = 1998,… , 2013	
																																								 																				
12 The methods proposed by Chassang et al. (2015) to identify interaction effects are not applicable to our data, 
as we cannot randomize the probability of a mayor being term-limited. But, by accounting, in the multinomial 
probit estimations, for the effects of term limits on the probability that a mayor resigns or runs for other public 
offices, we take into account the effects of term limits on the behavior of mayors. Assessing treatment effects 
may also be complicated when outcomes depend on unobserved effort decisions taken by agents, as it can even 
compromise the external validity of randomized controlled trials (Chassang et al. 2012). 
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where TBU$% is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in municipal election years (2001, 
2005, 2009 and 2013), and equals zero otherwise, V% are time effects (mandate dummies),13 
and the remaining variables and parameters are as defined above.  
The category left out of equation (4) is that of reelection-eligible mayors who have 
served three or more consecutive terms in office. Thus, a statistically significant SN,	 would 
indicate that term limits matter for the degree of opportunism. The hypothesis that term-
limited mayors are less opportunistic than reelection-eligible ones would be consistent with SN < 0 for municipal expenditures, and SN > 0 for municipal revenues (except for loans and 
transfers). It is worth noting that a model which did not include ADEF1GE2$% and (TBU$% ∗	ADEF1GE2$%) would simply compare term-limited mayors with all reelection-eligible 
mayors, without controlling for the latter’s experience. Thus, SN would reflect, not only the 
effect of term limits on opportunism, but also differences in opportunism related to 
experience.  
An extended version of the model of equation (4), which includes interactions with 
the dummy variables for resigning mayors (ResOther=1) and for mayors who run for other 
offices (ResOther=2) allows us to analyze the degree of opportunism in municipalities ran 
by true lame ducks, by term-limited mayors who resigned before the end of their terms, or 
ran for further political offices. In the second case, we expect greater opportunism than for 
the true lame duck mayors because resigning mayors were replaced by their vice-mayors, 
who then ran for mayor. The need to signal competence in the short period before the 
elections may have led to considerable electoral manipulations of fiscal variables. In the last 
case, the effect might be smaller. Although mayors who ran for further office may still have 
reputational concerns, they are either running for a substantially less visible and powerful 
																																								 																				
13 Since the election year dummy would be collinear with the year dummies, 4-year mandate dummies (for each 
election cycle) are included instead of the year dummies. 
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office (president of the municipal assembly) or for mayor in another municipality, where 
voters have limited information on their previous behavior. 
 
5. Empirical results 
This section presents the results of panel data fixed effects and simultaneous equations 
estimations, with standard errors clustered by municipality (in order to account for serial 
correlation), performed on panels comprising all Portuguese municipalities. We use a 
difference-in-differences approach to assess accountability and experience effects, and to 
check if term limits affect the opportunistic manipulation of local finances in election years. 
5.1 Baseline and extended difference-in-differences models 
The first step of the empirical analysis uses a difference-in-differences framework (see 
equation 1) to test for the presence of accountability effects of elections, that is, to test the 
hypothesis that term-limited mayors behave differently from reelection-eligible ones. In 
order to economize on space, we only report in Table 1 the results for the dummy variables 
related to terms in office. Regarding the fiscal variables, we start by showing the results for 
the main aggregates: the budget balance,14 total expenditures, and total revenues excluding 
loans. The results shown in column 1 do not indicate significant differences in average budget 
balances between term-limited and reelection-eligible mayors, as the dummy variable TL is 
not statistically significant. However, the results of columns 3 and 5 reveal that term-limited 
mayors have, on average, 6.6% lower total expenditures and 4.1% lower total revenues 
excluding loans than reelection-eligible mayors. Lower expenditures would please fiscal 
conservative voters (Peltzman, 1992), but studies focusing on local elections in Portugal find 
that opportunistic increases in expenditures pay off at elections (Veiga and Veiga, 2007b; 
																																								 																				
14 Since local finance data is reported on a cash basis, total revenues equal total expenditures. The budget 
balance is then obtained by excluding the transactions in financial assets and liabilities from the totals of 
revenues and expenditures.  
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Aidt, Veiga and Veiga, 2011). Thus, lower expenditure by term-limited mayors may result 
from the fact that they are not worried with reelection. By spending less, they need less 
revenue, which may help explain the negative coefficient for the latter. 
Table 1 –Difference-in-Differences Models for Accountability and Experience 
 Budget Balance Total Expenditures Total Revenues (excluding loans) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
TL 16.893 6.037 -0.066*** -0.057** -0.041** -0.042** 
 (0.816) (0.279) (-2.929) (-2.405) (-2.258) (-2.238) 
Term1or2  -19.174**  0.016  -0.002 
  (-2.161)  (1.443)  (-0.194) 
# Observations 4,746 4,746 4,748 4,748 4,748 4,748 
R-squared 0.135 0.136 0.479 0.479 0.591 0.591 
Notes: All regressions include municipal and year fixed effects, municipal-specific time trends, and 
the full set of control variables. The budget balance is measured in real euros (of 2015) per capita and 
the remaining fiscal variables are measured in logs of real euros per capita. Due to missing values on 
mayors’ characteristics for 1 municipality, the estimations cover 307 (of 308) municipalities. Robust 
t-statistics, clustered by municipality in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
The baseline DD models (columns 1, 3 and 5) compare local fiscal policies in 
municipalities run by term-limited and reelection-eligible mayors, regardless of the 
experience of the latter. Thus, the differences discussed above may combine accountability 
effects of term limits (reelection-eligible mayors are more accountable to voters than lame 
ducks), with experience effects (lame ducks have more experience than first- or second-term 
reelection-eligible mayors). In line with Alt et al. (2011), we disentangle experience and 
accountability effects by including in the DD model a dummy variable for municipalities 
with first- or second-term mayors (Term1or2). The category left out is now just that of 
municipalities with reelection-eligible mayors, who were in their third term or higher. Thus, 
the coefficient for term-limited mayors (TL) indicates the accountability effects, while the 
one for Term1or2 reflects experience effects. The empirical results of these extended DD 
models for accountability and experience are shown in columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 1. The 
results regarding the behavior of term-limited mayors remain essentially the same. The 
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novelty is that there is evidence of lower average budget balances (or of higher deficits) in 
municipalities run by less experienced mayors.15 
The results for the components of municipal expenditures and revenues for which 
statistically significant results were obtained are included in Table 2. Term limits do not 
influence expenditures with employees, but municipalities run by less experienced mayors 
seem to have slightly higher (1.3%) average expenditures (Column 1). This result may reflect 
the need to hire new personnel to implement the policies designed by the recently elected 
town council team combined with rigid labor market laws that make it very difficult to fire 
public employees in Portugal. The lower average expenditures of municipalities run by term-
limited mayors (found in Table 1) are mainly explained by lower capital expenditures, of 
which investment is the main component. As will be shown latter (in Table 5), the relative 
lower level of investment by mayors who are stepping down occurs mainly in the election 
year, due to opportunistic measures adopted by reelection-eligible mayors but not by lame 
ducks.  
Table 2 –Difference-in-Differences Models for Accountability and Experience: 
Components of Expenditures and Revenues 
 Compensation of Employees 
Total capital 
expenditures Own revenues 
Capital Grants 
(non-formula) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
TL 0.008 -0.118** -0.052* -0.222* 
 (0.487) (-2.466) (-1.871) (-1.747) 
Term1or2 0.013* 0.015 -0.024 0.038 
 (1.864) (0.686) (-1.648) (0.654) 
# Observations 4,748 4,748 4,748 4,730 
R-squared 0.848 0.349 0.626 0.258 
Notes: All regressions include municipal and year fixed effects, municipal-specific time trends, and 
the full set of control variables. The fiscal variables are measured in logs of real euros (of 2015) per 
capita. Due to missing values on mayors’ characteristics for 1 municipality, the estimations cover 307 
(of 308) municipalities. Robust t-statistics, clustered by municipality in parentheses. Significance 
level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
																																								 																				
15 Including two separate dummies for first- and second-term mayors leads to a similar conclusion. 
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The lower total average revenues of term-limited mayors (see Table 1) seem to result 
from lower own revenues and non-formula capital transfers, which is also consistent with 
lower capital expenditures. Apparently, lame ducks may make a smaller effort to negotiate 
with the central government capital grants beyond those that result from fiscal sharing and 
are formula determined. 
The results for the extended DD model that accounts for heterogeneous incentives 
among term-limited mayors are presented in Table 3.16 In order to facilitate the interpretation 
of the coefficients for the interactions, the estimated marginal effects of term limits for 
resigning mayors and for those that ran for other offices are reported in the last two rows. 
Again, there are no significant effects of term limits on average budget balances, regardless 
of the type of term-limited mayor we consider. Regarding expenditures, true lame ducks 
exhibit lower total and current expenditures than experienced reelection-eligible mayors. The 
reduction in total expenditures seems to be greater for those that resign before the end of 
their terms, as the interaction of (ResOther=1) with TL is statistically significant and the 
marginal effect is larger than for true lame ducks. Term-limited mayors who run for other 
offices or in different municipalities (ResOther=2) seem to behave like experienced 
reelection-eligible mayors (the reference category), as their marginal effects are never 
statistically significant. 
On what concerns revenues, the municipalities of true lame ducks and of those who 
run for other offices seem to behave like those of experienced reelection-eligible mayors, 
while municipalities with resigning term-limited mayors reduce total and fiscal revenues. 
Finally, less experienced reelection-eligible mayors register lower budget balances, 
																																								 																				
16	To economize space the results of the multinomial probit estimations are not reported here. They are available 
from the authors upon request. 
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expenditures and revenues than their more experienced and also reelection-eligible 
colleagues (the reference category). 
 
Table 3 – Extended DD Models for Accountability and Experience 
 Budget 
Balance 
Total 
Expenditures 
Current 
Expenditures 
Total Rev. 
(exc. loans) 
Fiscal 
Revenues 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
TL 2.670 -0.037* -0.034* -0.014 0.007 
 (0.190) (-1.714) (-1.923) (-0.721) (0.198) 
ResOther=1 -52.086*** 0.061** 0.014 0.002 -0.066 
(Resign) (-2.875) (2.350) (0.941) (0.105) (-1.428) 
ResOther=2 -6.386 -0.007 0.052*** -0.016 -0.029 
(Run other office) (-0.363) (-0.312) (2.904) (-0.828) (-0.828) 
TL*(ResOther=1) -5.401 -0.070* -0.038 -0.089*** -0.174** 
 (-0.202) (-1.724) (-1.350) (-2.623) (-2.529) 
TL*(ResOther=2) -1.874 0.040 0.016 0.026 0.003 
 (-0.080) (1.309) (0.627) (0.943) (0.049) 
Term1or2 -12.851* -0.896*** -0.090*** -0.049*** -1.034*** 
 (-1.802) (-3.302) (-3.043) (-1.464) (-3.338) 
# Observations 4,748 4,748 4,748 4,748 4,748 
Marginal effects of term limits    
ResOther=1 -2.730 -0.108*** -0.073*** -0.103*** -0.167** 
(Resign) (-0.104) (-2.676) (-2.636) (-3.127) (-2.563) 
ResOther=2 0.796 0.003 -0.019 0.012 0.010 
(Run other office) (0.033) (0.100) (-0.753) (0.468) (0.210) 
Notes: Estimation of a simultaneous model which combines a multinomial probit for ResOther with 
a linear regression for the fiscal dependent variable. Only the results of the latter are reported here. 
The regressions include municipal and year fixed effects, region-specific time trends, and the full set 
of control variables. Budget balances are measures in real euros (of 2015) per capita, while the other 
fiscal variables are in logs of real euros per capita. Due to missing values on mayors’ characteristics 
for 1 municipality, the estimations cover 307 (of 308) municipalities. Robust t-statistics, clustered by 
municipality in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
5.2 Difference-in-differences models for Political Budget Cycles 
In order to check if term limits affect the opportunistic manipulation of local finances 
in election years, we estimate the extended DD model of equation (4), which interacts an 
election-year dummy variable with dummy variables for municipalities with term-limited 
mayors (TL) and with less experienced reelection-eligible mayors (Term1or2). Table 4 shows 
the results obtained for the main fiscal aggregates. The estimated marginal effects of the 
Election Year for term-limited and less experienced mayors are reported in the last two rows. 
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Table 4 – Difference-in-Differences (DD) Models for Political Budget Cycles 
 Budget Balance 
Total 
Expenditures 
Total 
Revenues 
(excl. loans) 
Total Revenues 
(excl. loans and 
formula grants) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Election year -77.702*** 0.099*** 0.031*** 0.004 
 (-6.502) (8.315) (3.657) (0.220) 
TL 1.737 -0.035 -0.024 -0.047 
 (0.078) (-1.460) (-1.251) (-1.216) 
Election year * TL 1.708 -0.105*** -0.109*** -0.089*** 
 (0.073) (-4.890) (-8.655) (-3.769) 
Term1or2 -27.069*** 0.029** 0.004 0.024 
 (-2.914) (2.381) (0.358) (1.248) 
Election year*Term1or2 28.535** -0.038*** -0.012 -0.012 
 (2.206) (-3.038) (-1.363) (-0.695) 
# Observations 4,746 4,748 4,748 4,746 
R-squared 0.119 0.445 0.556 0.372 
Marginal effects of Election year    
Term-limited mayors -75.994*** -0.006 -0.079*** -0.085*** 
 (-3.566) (-0.325) (-7.606) (-4.473) 
First- or second-term mayors -49.167*** 0.061*** 0.019*** -0.008 
 (-4.915) (7.131) (3.002) (-0.590) 
Notes: All regressions include municipal and term fixed effects, municipal-specific time trends, and 
the full set of control variables. The budget balance is measured in real euros (of 2015) per capita and 
the remaining fiscal variables are measured in logs of real euros per capita. Due to missing values on 
mayors’ characteristics for 1 municipality, the estimations cover 307 (of 308) municipalities. Robust 
t-statistics, clustered by municipality, in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
Consistent with the evidence for PBCs in Portugal found in previous studies (Aidt, 
Veiga and Veiga, 2011; Veiga and Veiga, 2007a), budget balances are lower (or deficits are 
higher), and total expenditures are higher, for the reference category of experienced 
reelection-eligible mayors, in election years than in the remaining years of the electoral 
cycle.17 Higher total revenues (excluding loans) in elections years may seem somewhat 
surprising, but the fact that they increase less than expenditures (3.1 vs. 9.9 percent), is 
																																								 																				
17 The budget balance is reduced by 77.70 euros per capita, while expenditures increase by 9.9 percent (note 
that they are measured in logs), relative to the other years of the electoral cycle. 
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consistent with the adoption of opportunistic measures that deteriorate the budget balance. It 
is also worth noting that the rise in revenues results from the tendency of the central 
government to increase the global amount of grants in election years. That is, as found by 
Veiga and Pinho (2007) and Veiga and Veiga (2013), grants are managed opportunistically 
by the central government. In fact, when formula grants are excluded from total revenues 
(column 4), the election year effect on the latter disappears. 
The penultimate row of Table 4 reports the estimated marginal effects of the election 
year for term-limited mayors.18 The latter cut budget balances slightly less than experienced 
reelection-eligible mayors (the reference category), do not increase expenditures, and reduce 
revenues in election years. As will be shown below, the reduction is revenues is primarily 
due to a reduction in non-formula (conditional) grants received from the central government, 
and not to opportunistic behavior of term-limited mayors. The last row of Table 4 shows the 
marginal effects of the election year for less experienced (first- or second-term) reelection-
eligible mayors. These seem to be less opportunistic than their more experienced and also 
reelection-eligible colleagues, inducing smaller election year reductions in budget balances 
and increases expenditures. Overall, the results indicate that experienced reelection-eligible 
mayors are the most opportunistic. 
Table 5 reports the results for expenditure and revenue components. Expenditures on 
employees and on investment significantly increase during election years in the 
municipalities run by experienced reelection-eligible mayors (the reference category). 
Although fiscal revenues are reduced in elections years, they are compensated by increases 
in non-formula (conditional) grants received from the central government in election years. 
These may result from greater effort or greater political ability and connections of reelection-
																																								 																				
18 The overall election year effect for term-limited mayors corresponds to the sum of the coefficients for 
Election year and for Election year*TL. 
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eligible experienced mayors, or from the above-referred opportunistic management of grants 
by the central government. 
 
Table 5 – Difference-in-Differences (DD) Models for Political Budget Cycles: 
Components of Expenditures and Revenues 
 Expenditures Revenues 
 Compensation 
Employees Investment Fiscal 
Non-formula 
Grants 
VARIABLES (1) (3) (5) (7) 
Election year 0.101*** 0.145*** -0.071*** 0.096** 
 (15.683) (4.306) (-6.730) (2.188) 
TL 0.036** -0.020 -0.018 -0.070 
 (2.302) (-0.252) (-0.650) (-0.764) 
Election year * TL -0.145*** -0.171*** 0.046*** -0.247*** 
 (-15.203) (-2.628) (2.774) (-3.783) 
Term1or2 0.027*** 0.055 -0.032** 0.053 
 (3.636) (1.481) (-2.050) (1.145) 
Election year * Term1or2 -0.042*** -0.066* 0.038*** -0.052 
 (-5.822) (-1.942) (3.234) (-1.208) 
# Observations 4,748 4,748 4,748 4,736 
R-squared 0.781 0.458 0.720 0.234 
Marg. effects of Election Year     
Term-limited mayors -0.043*** -0.026 -0.024 -0.151*** 
 (-6.040) (-0.446) (-1.515) (-2.904) 
First- or second-term mayors 0.059*** 0.079*** -0.033*** 0.045 
 (13.757) (3.144) (-3.754) (1.256) 
Notes: All regressions include municipal and term fixed effects, municipal-specific time trends, and 
the full set of control variables. The fiscal variables are measured in logs of real euros (of 2015) per 
capita. Due to missing values on mayors’ characteristics for 1 municipality, the estimations cover 307 
(of 308) municipalities. Robust t-statistics, clustered by municipality, in parentheses. Significance 
level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimated marginal effects for each category when the other 
categories are set at zero. 
 
The marginal effects of Election year are quite different for the municipalities of 
term-limited mayors. First, there is a reduction in the compensation of employees. Second, 
there are no significant election-year effects on investment expenditures and fiscal revenues. 
Third, there is a reduction in non-formula (conditional) grants from the central government, 
which helps explain the reduction in total revenues found in Table 3. This may result from 
lower effort of these mayors, expressed in a smaller number of applications for funding 
and/or weaker lobbying at the central government. Thus, binding term limits seem to affect 
	
	
27	
the behavior of mayors, eliminating the strategic manipulation of wages, investment, and 
fiscal revenues to woo the electorate, and the effort to obtain grants from the central 
government. 
As indicated by the results shown in Table 3, less experienced reelection-eligible 
mayors seem to be less opportunistic than their more experienced and also reelection-eligible 
colleagues. Concretely, they increase expenditures and reduce fiscal revenues by smaller 
amounts in election years. Additionally, they seem to have a smaller capacity to obtain non-
formula related grants from the central government. 
In order to check for heterogeneous behavior of term-limited mayors in election 
years, the model of equation (4) was extended by including interactions with the dummy 
variables for the mayors that resigned before the end of the term (ResOther=1) and for those 
who ran for other political offices (ResOther=2). Since the inclusion of several additional 
interaction terms makes the tables of results quite long and hard to interpret, only the 
estimated marginal effects of the Election year are reported in Table 6.19 The results suggest 
that that true lame ducks are less opportunistic than equally experienced reelection-eligible 
mayors (the base category), as they do not increase total expenditures and do not decrease 
fiscal revenues in election years. The same appears to apply to term-limited mayors who ran 
for other offices or in different municipalities, as their estimated marginal effects are quite 
similar to those for true lame ducks. Municipalities with resigning term-limited mayors, who 
handed over the leadership to the vice-presidents, exhibit greater reductions in fiscal 
revenues than true lame ducks, do not face an election year reduction in non-formula 
(conditional) grants from the central government, and rely more on revenues from loans. 
																																								 																				
19	Graphs of the estimated marginal effects of Election year are presented in Figure A.3 of the Appendix. The 
full estimation results are available from the authors upon request.	
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Table 6 – Extended DD Models for Political Budget Cycles – Marginal Effects of Election Year 
Marginal effects of 
Election Year 
Budget 
Balance 
Total 
Expenditures 
Total Revenues 
(excluding 
loans) 
Total Revenues 
(excluding loans & 
formula grants) 
Fiscal 
Revenues 
Revenues from 
Non-formula 
Grants 
Revenues from 
Financial 
Liabilities (loans) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Base category (experienced 
reelection-eligible mayors) 
-77.520*** 0.100*** 0.032*** 0.005 -0.074*** 0.102** 0.762*** 
(-6.735) (8.871) (3.934) (0.289) (-7.154) (2.574) (8.595) 
True lame ducks -63.053*** -0.015 -0.083*** -0.105*** -0.030 -0.207** 0.719*** 
 (-3.042) (-0.593) (-5.162) (-3.442) (-1.278) (-2.281) (2.843) 
Resigning lame ducks  -138.730* 0.044 -0.073** -0.016 -0.084*** 0.212 1.578*** 
(-1.923) (0.722) (-2.417) (-0.278) (-2.933) (1.334) (3.947) 
Lame ducks who ran for 
other Offices 
-68.994** -0.016 -0.076*** -0.075*** -0.019 -0.166** 0.743*** 
(-2.071) (-0.603) (-5.544) (-2.920) (-0.887) (-2.504) (3.119) 
Term 1 or 2 mayors -44.299*** 0.057*** 0.019*** -0.010 -0.031*** 0.016 0.651*** 
 (-4.511) (6.743) (3.009) (-0.695) (-3.535) (0.464) (8.847) 
        
# Observations 4,748 4,748 4,748 4,748 4,748 4,748 4,567 
Notes: The estimated marginal effects are based on the estimation of a simultaneous equation model which combines a multinomial probit for Res_Other and 
a linear regression for the fiscal dependent variable. The budget balance is measured in real euros (of 2015) per capita and the remaining fiscal variables are 
measured in logs of real euros per capita. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Although the estimated coefficients for the budget and total expenditures also suggest 
greater opportunism, Wald tests do not reject the equality of marginal effects for resigning and 
true lame ducks for these two fiscal variables. The stronger opportunistic behavior may be due 
to the need to signal competence by the former vice-mayors who replaced the resigning mayors, 
as practically all of them ran for mayors in the next elections. Being less known to voters than 
experienced mayors, and having a shorter period to show what they are capable of, they might 
have felt the need to behave more opportunistically in order to increase the likelihood of being 
elected in 2013. Finally, as indicated by the results shown in Tables 3 and 4, less experienced 
mayors seem to behave less opportunistically than, also reelection-eligible, more experienced 
ones. That is, they decrease budget balances, increase expenditures, and reduce fiscal revenues 
by smaller amounts in election years. 
 
5.3 Robustness tests 
Several tests were conducted to check the robustness of the above-described results.20 
First, we tried alternative versions of the vector of control variables, such as including more 
demographic variables, more mayors’ characteristics, or excluding some or all of the mayors’ 
characteristics. Second, we analyzed if the effects of term limits depend on mayors’ ideology. 
Third, the robustness of the results for the true lame ducks was checked by excluding resigning 
and candidate lame ducks from the sample. Fourth, we replaced the municipal specific linear 
time trends with the Hodrick-Prescott trend of the dependent variable in the estimations. Fifth, 
we used region specific trends instead of municipal specific trends in all estimations. Finally, 
we removed the 30 municipalities belonging to the archipelagos of Madeira and Azores. The 
main results and conclusions did not change materially in any of these robustness tests. 
 
																																								 																				
20 These tests are available from the authors upon request. 
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6. Discussion and conclusion 
The study of the effects of the introduction of term limits at the local government level in 
Portugal reveals that municipalities with term-limited mayors have lower expenditures and 
revenues than those with reelection-eligible mayors. These results contrast with those of Besley 
and Case (1995; 2003) and Alt et al. (2011), who found that US states with term-limited 
governors had greater expenditures and taxes. Several differences between the two countries 
may explain these contradicting results. First, while American voters seem to be fiscally 
conservative (Peltzman, 1992), there is evidence that Portuguese voters appreciate increases in 
expenditures and reward opportunism at the polls (Veiga and Veiga, 2007b; Aidt, Veiga and 
Veiga, 2011).21  
Second, since Portugal is a highly centralized country, where local governments 
strongly depend on transfers from the central government, it is not surprising that Portuguese 
voters are pleased with increases in expenditures in their municipality. In our sample, own 
revenues generated by local governments only represent around one third of effective revenues, 
indicating that citizens are not fully aware of their true costs, or that they perceive that most of 
the costs are being passed on to others. Third, unlike in the US, Portuguese municipalities 
cannot file for bankruptcy, meaning that those that faced greater financial distress were bailed 
out by the central government. Thus, both the soft budget constraint and the common pool 
problems apply to the Portuguese case. Finally, citizens’ engagement in fiscal matters and fiscal 
policy transparency is lower in Portugal. While in the US, citizens are frequently called upon 
to express their opinion on fiscal affairs through initiatives such as open government, 
participatory budgeting, and referenda on important investment decisions, referenda at the 
																																								 																				
21 On this topic, the international empirical evidence at the subnational level is mixed, revealing that it is country-
specific. While Brender (2003) found that Israeli voters penalize expansionary fiscal policies by mayors, 
Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004), Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008), and Jones et al. (2012), respectively 
analyzing the Russian, Brazilian, and Argentinian cases, conclude the opposite. 
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municipal level never occurred in Portugal, and measures to increase citizens’ participation and 
fiscal policy transparency have only recently been adopted. 
 Regarding political budget cycles, the empirical evidence indicates that lame ducks 
manage budget balances and the size and composition of expenditures and revenues in a less 
opportunistic manner than experienced reelection-eligible mayors. These results are consistent 
with List and Sturm (2006) and Klein and Sakurai (2015) who found that term limits mitigate 
political budget cycles, and with Aidt and Shvets (2012) who found that term-limited US state 
legislators provide less pork to their constituencies. Our empirical evidence is also supportive 
of Smart and Sturm’s (2013: 93) claim that, without term-limits, “the payoffs from future 
periods in office can make even public-spirited politicians unwilling to take actions today that 
are in the interest of voters, if doing so reduces their re-election prospects.”  
As indicated by Besley and Case (1995), term-limited policymakers are not all alike, as 
some may run for further office, and parties still exist after the election. Thus, political 
reputation may not end with a binding term limit. Our results suggest that, both over the entire 
term and in the election year, fiscal policy choices of mayors that ran for president of the 
Municipal Assembly of their municipality, or for mayor in another municipality, were similar 
to those of true lame ducks. Thus, they were also less opportunistic than equally experienced 
reelection-eligible mayors, probably because they ran for a lower office and were already well 
known by their constituency, or would be evaluated by inhabitants of other municipalities. The 
highest degree of opportunism among municipalities with term-limited mayors was found in 
those whose mayors resigned before the end of the term. These municipalities seem to 
undertake larger election-year reductions in taxes, matched by greater increases in financial 
liabilities (loans), than those of other types of term-limited mayors. This degree of election year 
fiscal manipulation, more similar to the behavior of reelection-eligible mayors, may result from 
the efforts of the vice-mayors who replaced the resigning mayors, most of whom ran for mayor 
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in 2013. Since they were in charge for a relatively small period and were less known by the 
electorate, they may have felt the need to signal competence. 
Overall, our results are in line with the theoretical model of Smart and Sturm (2013) 
and suggest that term-limits are in the interest of Portuguese voters, even though elections may 
have a disciplining effect on politicians and enable voters to retain well-performing 
incumbents. This institutional change may also have positive effects on the adoption of new 
management practices, the transparency of fiscal policy, and on lobbyist capture. However, 
more time is needed to clearly evaluate the net advantages of the introduction of term-limits at 
the local government level in Portugal. 
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Appendix:  
 
Table A.1 – Descriptive Statistics (1998-2013) 
VARIABLES Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Fiscal variables (in real euros per capita, at 2015 prices)    
Budget Balance 4,923 -25.70 160.89 -3955.61 1301.34 
Total Expenditures 4,925 1076.16 591.39 173.66 8614.36 
Total Current 4,925 593.72 318.01 91.94 2868.39 
Comp. Employees 4,925 292.67 179.30 18.78 1888.96 
Total Capital 4,925 482.44 355.61 45.54 6656.47 
Investment 4,925 333.92 285.03 4.19 6289.28 
Total Revenues (exc. Loans) 4,925 994.70 531.46 199.93 8320.12 
Total Current 4,925 638.11 295.64 129.27 2734.77 
Fiscal Revenues 4,925 159.70 141.80 6.16 1566.25 
Total Capital (exc. Loans) 4,925 356.35 301.82 2.07 6536.90 
Non-formula Grants 4,925 187.62 196.57 0.00 5404.80 
Loans (Financial liabilities) 4,925 83.85 186.44 0.00 7164.29 
Own Revenues 4,925 295.99 196.57 38.45 2660.42 
Term and election variables      
Number of terms (mayor) 4,916 2.62 1.77 0.00 10.00 
TL (term-limited mayor) 4,928 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Resign (Res_Other=1) 4,928 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Run Other Office (Res_Other=2) 4,928 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Term_1_or_2 4,928 0.57 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Election year 4,928 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Main control variables      
Left-wing mayor 4,928 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Independent Mayor 4,928 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00 
Majority 4,928 0.78 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Unemployment rate - deviation from HP 
trend (in p.p.) 4,824 0.03 0.71 -7.33 4.24 
Mayors’ characteristics      
Age 4,887 51.71 8.12 28.00 78.00 
Lives in the municipality 4,853 0.92 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Born in the municipality 4,887 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Female 4,899 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Sources: Directorate General for Local Authorities (DGAL), Portugal. National Elections Commission 
(CNE), National Institute of Statistics (INE), Institute of Employment and Professional Training (IEFP), 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, Pordata - FFMS, and Sales Index - Marktest. 
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Figure A.1 – Year Dummies for the Treated Group in the Pre-Treatment Period 
 
Note: The graphs show the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals of year dummies for the treated 
municipalities in the pre-treatment period (1998-2009). The estimated models also include municipality and year 
fixed effects. The budget balance is in euros per capita, while the other variables are in logs of euros per capita.  
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Figure A.2 – Linear Trend for the Treated Group in the Pre-Treatment Period 
 
 
Note: This figure shows the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals of linear trends 
for the treated municipalities in the pre-treatment period (1998-2009), obtained in regressions 
for each fiscal variable, which included municipality and year fixed effects. Expenditure and 
revenue variables are in logs of real euros per capita. The budget balance (in real euros per capita) 
was divided by 1000 in order to fit the same scale (in the vertical axis) as the logs of the other 
variables. 
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Figure A.3 - Extended DD Model for PBCs: Marginal Effects of Election Year 
 
	
 
Note: Estimated marginal effects with 90% confidence intervals. The budget balance is measured in real euros 
(of 2015) per capita and the remaining fiscal variables are measured in logs of real euros per capita. 
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